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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE INCOME TAXES
The constitutionality of state income taxation has been consid-
ered by several courts with the result that some have held state
income tax laws constitutional and some have held them unconsti-
tutional. The courts which have passed upon the question have
been confined to a consideration of the provisions of the consti-
tution of the particular state and have held that such a tax is in
conflict with the constitutional limitations or that such a tax is
permissible as not being prohibited by the constitution. The deci-
sion in each instance in which the income tax was held unconsti-
tutional has been based upon the conclusion that an income tax is
a property tax1 within the meaning of the term as used in the
constitution under consideration. The Supreme Court of Wash-
mgton has fallen in line with several jurisdictions in holding that
collect the money due on the contract. Since the condition precedent here
of getting taxi insurance was performed neither by D nor by N Co., but
D thereafter accepted payments on the car, knowing that P had not waived
the performance of the condition, D was held liable to P on the contract
although D had neither expressly nor impliedly assumed in its contract
with the assignor the duty of taking out this insurance. The court said
that the appellant "in accepting and exacting payments, assumed the cor-
responding duty to perform the conditions the contract imposed as a con-
sideration for their payment." It would not allow D "to receive the ben-
efits without performing the burdens."
'Cases holding that an income tax is not a property tax: Glasgow v.
Rouse, 43 o. 479 (1869) Wanng v. Savaoinah, 60 Ga. 93 (1878) In re
OpznonT of Justices, 77 N. H. 611, 93 Atl. 311 (1915) Ludlow Saylor Wire
Co. v. Wollbrintck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W 196 (1918) Hattiesburg Grocery
Co. v. Robertson State Ra. Agent, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4, 25 A. L. R. 748
(1921) Diefendorf 'v. Gallet, 10 Pac. (2d) 311 (Idaho 1932) O'Connell
v. State Board of Equalization, 25 Pac. (2d) 114 (Mont. 1933).
Cases holding income taxes to be property taxes: State v. Frear 148
Wis. 456, 134 N. W 673, 135 N. W 164, L. R. A. 1915 B. 569, 606 Ann. Cas.
1913 A. 1147 (1912). Since Wisconsin specifically provides for an income
tax the statement by the court should not be given much weight as an
authority holding income to be property. It would seem a more logical
conclusion would be that Wisconsin recognizes an income tax as a sep-
arate class of taxes, especially since the constitution provides for prop-
erty taxes, excise taxes and income taxes. Opinion of the Justices, 220
Mass. 613, 108 N. E. 570 (1915) State v. Pinfer 30 Del. 416, 108 Atl. 43(1919). "We prefer to take the natural, logical and reasonable position
that income is property, within the meaning of that word as used in the
exemption clause, Sec. 1, Art. 8, of the Delaware Constitution, and we
are inclined to believe that no court in this country today, in construing a
constitutional provision similar to ours, would maintain the contrary
position." The qualifying phrase "within the meaning of that word as
used in the exemption clause, Sec. 1, Art. 8, of the Delaware Constitution"
tempers the case and holding. The court clearly indicates that they are
considering income as property only beause the word "property" mani-
festly meant "anything that was taxable under the inherent power of the
legislature." Whether or not the justices would have reached the same
result if they had been considering the nature of income tax generally,
or under the Washington Constitution, is a question for conjecture.
Eliasberg Bros. Mere. Co. -V. Grmes, 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56, 11 A. L. R.
300 (1920). "The constitution of Alabama placed a limitation of 65/100
of 1 per cent on the value of the taxable property within the state." Here
again the court was deciding that "property" as used in the state consti-
tution was broad enough to include income taxes. The reasoning of the
court is criticized by Mr. Harsch in 6 Wash. L. R. 97. In Barchrac, V. Nel-
son, 182 N. E. 909 (I1. 1932), holding the tax to be a property tax the
court says, "money or anything of value acquired as gain or profit from
capital or labor is property, and that, in the aggregate these acquisitions
constitute income, and, in accordance with the axiom that the whole in-
cludes all of its parts, income includes property and nothing but property.
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such a tax is a property tax2 within the definition in our constitu-
tion that, " 'property' as used herein shall mean and include
everything, whether tangible or intangible, subject to ownership."
If it is truly determined that a tax on net income is fundamentally
a property tax there can be no quarrel with the conclusion that
a graduated income tax is m violation of the "uniformity clause"
and must therefore be held unconstitutional. A review of the cases
holding a net income tax to be a property tax would seem to indi-
cate that all courts which have so held have failed to take into full
consideration the fundamental factors which determine the proper
classification of any given tax. Such cases have also disregarded
certain well recognized rules of constitutional construction in that
limitations on the taxing power not expressly stated have been
read into the constitution by an all inclusive definition given to
the word property
It is important to examine the characteristics of excise and prop-
erty taxes in order to determine the proper classification of a net
income tax. Excise taxes are defined3 as, "including every form
of charge imposed by public authority for the purpose of raising
revenue upon the performance of an act, the enjoyment of a privi-
lege, or the engaging in an occupation." Obviously the subject
of an excise tax is the exercise of a privilege or right or the doing
of certain acts specified by the legislature to be taxable. The tax
is upon the individual and such individual is liable only when he
has brought himself within the statute providing for the tax by
the exercise of a privilege, right or act made taxable. Excise taxes
are commonly computed by the value of the right exercised. In
this connection we must keep in mind that there is a clear distinc-
tion between the subject matter of the tax and the method used
to determine the amount of the tax.4 Washington has recognized
this distinction in the case of inheritance taxes.'
Property taxes are usually assessed to the owner of the prop-
erty as of a certain date. The owner is liable for the taxes because
ownership is the reason for the tax attaching.7 A popular miscon-
ception that the tax is levied on the property itself is probably a
result of the fact that taxes have generally become a lien on prop-
erty by statute.8 The fact that the state, through its legislature,
has given up its right to proceed against the individual taxpayer
in the collection does not and cannot alter the subject of taxation.
and therefore is itself property" The court finds that a very broad mean-
ing has been attached to property as used in the constitution. A careful
reading of cases cited by the Illinois court as holding income to be prop-
erty does not reveal a very impressive array of authority supporting such
a holding.
For splendid law review articles discussing the problem of constitu-
tionality of state income tax laws see 12 Minn. L. R. 683, by Prof. Rott-
schaffer, and 6 Wash. L. R. 97, by Mr. Alfred Harsch.
CulZiton- v. Chase, 74 Wash. Dec. 342, 25 Pac. (2d) 81 (1933).
3TUattiesburg Groce?ny Co. v. Robertson, supra.
'Dtefendorf v. Gallet, supra.
'In re Corbzns Estate, 107 Wash. 424, 181 Pac. 910 (1919).
Rem. Rev. Stats. 11111-2.
Cooley on Taxation. 4th Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 24, p. 930. Wilbert v. Yakma
County, 132 Wash. 219, 231 Pac. 931 (1925).
gHesne v. Levee Comnmassioners, 86 U. S. 655 (1874) State v. O'Neil,
55 N. J. L. 58, 25 Atl. 273 (1892).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
It is obvious that excise taxes and property taxes are in fact
levied upon the individual. The distinction between them lies in
the fact that excise taxes are levied because of the doing of an act
or the exercise of a privilege or right, whereas property taxes are
levied because of ownership.
Clearly the income tax is not upon the individual because of
ownership of property Whether the taxpayer has one cent of the
income earned by him during the tax year on any given date is
immaterial. The income tax becomes payable because the person
has earned more than a certain amount of money during the course
of one year. It seems more logical to say that the income tax is a
privilege tax which attaches because the individual has exercised
a right or privilege of acquiring material wealth. If, therefore,
the income tax does not satisfy the test of a property tax but does
satisfy the test of an excise tax, is it not arguable that the courts
which have decided an income tax was a property tax either did
not carefully distinguish between property and excise taxes or were
misled by a failure to distinguish between the subject matter of the
tax and the method used to determine the amount of the tax?
The conclusion that an income tax should be classed as an excise
tax seems more apparent when the analogy between income taxes
and inheritance taxes is shown. Inheritance taxes are a tax upon
the individual, which attach because of the exercise of a right or
privilege0 and the amount of the tax is deternned by applying
a rate to the value of the estate inherited. If we were to apply to
inheritance taxes the logic used in construing the income tax as
a property tax, the following result would be reached. Inheritance
is composed of money or things of value which are subject to
ownership, and therefore a graduated inheritance tax is a property
tax and void under the uniformity clause. Obviously this logic
is not applied to inheritance taxes as they are universally held
to be excise taxes. If the true basis of an inheritance tax or an
income tax is the power of the sovereign to tax any act, whatso-
ever, done within the state when not prohibited by the state or
federal constitution, logically, it seems that no proper interpreta-
tion could be placed on the Fourteenth Amendment which would
result in a holding that income taxes and inheritance taxes are
property taxes. And it seems even more difficult to justify deci-
sions which declare an income tax to be a property tax and declare
an inheritance tax to be an excise tax. As inheritance taxes can
be levied even though the taxing government does not confer the
privilege of passing or receiving property, any distinction which
may be drawn on the basis of a privilege conferred by the state is
unsound. 0
It seems equally unsound to attempt to distinguish inheritance
taxes and income taxes on the ground that an inheritance tax may
only be collected once while income taxes may be collected several
times. Clearly the income tax is only collectible once on the in-
come earned in any one year. Each time the privilege is exercised
OMagoun v. Illinots Trust and Savzngs Bank, 170 U. S. 283 (1898) In
re Corbsns Estate, supra.10Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969
(1899)
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the excise tax will attach. If it can be said that the basis of an
inheritance tax or an income tax is the exercise of a privilege or
right, then the fact that the exercise of this privilege or right may
exist more often in the case of an income tax than in the case of
an inheritance tax should not make any difference.
The constitutional definition of property suggests that the fun-
damental basis of a property tax is ownership. It seems that the
real intent and purpose of the definition is to secure a uniform
rate of taxation on tangibles and intangibles and not to unreason-
ably extend the limitations1 ' on taxation by including within the
class of property taxes 2 those forms of taxes which are clearly
and properly excises. If it is more reasonable to classify an income
tax as an excise rather than a property tax, the problem of its un-
constitutionality in violation of the uniformity clause is removed
and the tax may be sustained."2
HAROLD HESTNES.
RECENT CASES
ASSIGNMENTS-UTUPE WAGES-UNDER CONTRACT, EMPLOYMENT OR POS-
SIBLE CONTRACT OR EMPLOYMENT. H attempted to assign to W "33%% in
all plays, novels, motion picture scenarios and stories now and hereafter
written by me and all returns of money received by me." At the time of
the purported assignment H, a writer, was not employd, but later W
proved that he had worked 28 weeks for Warner Bros. The character of
the employment was not shown. Upon suit by W against H for an
accounting under the written assignment, the court held that the assign-
ment was invalid, since it was not based on present employment or exist-
ing contract, Orkow v. Orkow, 23 Pac. (2) 781, (Cal. 1933).
Besides upholding assignments of salaries or money due, Rodgers v.
Torrent, 111 Mich. 680, 70 N. W 335 (1899) Carnegie Trust Co. v. Bat-
tery Place Realty Co., 67 Misc. Rep. 452, 122 N. Y. S. 697 (1910) Vollmer
v. Vollmer 46 Idaho 97, 266 Pac. 677 (1928) the courts sanction assign-
ments of wages to be earned in the future under a contract, or employ-
ment in existence at the time without a contract binding the employer,
State St. Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 259 Ill. App. 589, Judg. Aff. 345
Ill. 160, 177 N. E. 702 (1931) Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553, 102 Pac. 956
1L The state constitutions are limitations upon and not grants of legis-
lative powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 759;
Gentier v. Ditmoar 204 N. Y. 20, 97 N. E. 464 (1912) Everett v. Anderson,
106 Wash. 355, 180 Pac. 144 (1919). "Nothing but express constitutional
limitations upon legislative authority can exclude anything, to which the
authority extends from the grasp of the taxing power, if the legislature
in its discretion shall at any time select it for revenue purposes." Cooley
on Taxation, 4th Ed., Vol. 1. paragraph 71.
12 The constitutions of California, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin expressly provide for an income
tax.
13 In an attack upon the constitutionality of any statute the burden
of proof is upon the opponents of the statute to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that it is in conflict with the constitution and therefore void.
Washington has recognized this rule and in State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77
Pac. 961 (1904), determines the rule to be: "When the constitutionality
of an act of the legislature is drawn in question, the court will not declare
it void unless its invalidity is so apparent as to leave no reasonable doubt
upon the subject." In view of the difference of opinion on the subject of
whether an income tax is a property or an excise tax it seems question-
able whether the invalidity of the income tax law is so apparent as
to leave no reasonable doubt upon the subject.
